A political business cycle is tested in a monetary reaction function. Positive evidence is a result of the 1930s and 1940s and not post-war elections. In addition, there is no evidence of such a cycle in a rational expectations model.
Introduction
The search for evidence of political influence on economic policy has focused on the post-war period when policy makers were given discretionary powers as a result of the Bretton Woods system and the Employment Act of 1946. According to public choice theory the political business cycle (PBC) literature argues that policy changes that occur prior to elections will be used by the incumbent to insure reelection of the individual/party. The purpose of this paper is to test for PBC effects on Fed policy for the 1917-1984 period in a reduced-form reaction function to determine when attempts to change monetary policy before elections emerged in accordance with the PBC hypothesis. 
The model
where B, M, y, D, and P are the first differences of the logs of the monetary base, the M1 money supply, real GNP, Treasury debt, and the GNP deflator and where CPR and U are the level of the 4-6 month commercial paper rate and the unemployment rate. These variables are lagged one period to reflect the information set available to the Federal Reserve in period t. Positive signs are expected for a 1 through a 4 assuming the Federal Reserve increases the base to accommodate an increased demand for real cash balances (a 1 ) during an expansion, to dampen interest rate changes (a 2 ), and to accommodate deficit spending (a 3 ). A policy to offset increases in the unemployment rate results in a predicted positive sign for a 4 , while a policy to dampen inflation results in a predicted negative sign for a 5 .
EV is proxied by four dummy variables that capture extra policy stimulus prior to an electron: EV1 (0, 0, 0, 1); EV2 (1, 0, 1, 2); EV3 (0, 0, 1, 1); and EV4 (0, 1, 0, 1) . EV1 (EV4) hypothesizes monetary stimulus every presidential (Congressional) election year, while EV3 hypothesizes monetary stimulus in the third and fourth years to allow for lagged policy effects. EV2 hypothesizes a four-year cycle of increased monetary tightness in the two years following an election and increased monetary stimulus in the two years prior to an election.
Several electoral interaction terms are tested. The hypothesis could be made that if no electoral cycle is implemented, then no advantage is created for the incumbent party. Thus, W is a dummy variable equal to 0 (1) for the preceding four years when an incumbent party loses (wins) an election and WEV1-WEV4 are formed by the multiplication of W and EV where the expected sign is positive. The null hypothesis that the electoral cycle affects the degree to which the Fed accommodates the deficit also is tested by interaction terms DDEVI-DDEV4, equal to EV times the debt variable where the expected sign is positive. 
A rational expectations model
A rational expectations approach to the PBC argues that the incumbent party influences the Fed to provide monetary stimulus in period t that is undetected by economic agents/ voters in period t. 5 A forecast error (e t = M t -t ) can be derived from eq. (1) that includes an EV term because rational economic agents are assumed to factor into their base or M/ estimates a positive stimulus due to the upcoming elections. The forecast errors must follow a process showing that the Fed producing positive unanticipated policy changes prior to the election. Therefore, e t is modeled as follows:
where a positive and significant a 2 coefficient is evidence that extra stimulus (e t > 0) beyond the electoral cycle tested in the reaction function is present.
A rolling regression technique is employed where eq. (1) including EV is estimated with the last thirty-one years of data to provide a one-year-ahead forecast in order to obtain a vector of e it where i = 1953-1984. The result of regressing e t on the same EV (not reported) shows that a 2 is never positive and significant in eq. (2) when EV3, EV2, WEV2 or WEV3 is employed as EV in either the base or M/ equations. This evidence would suggest that there is no evidence of a PBC within the framework of a rational expectations model.
This conclusion depends on the specification of the reaction function and on the degree of rationality or astuteness modeled. Because knowledge of the winner is not known prior to the election, the error terms derived from the reaction function do not reflect all of the available information (past knowledge of whether the incumbent party won or loss). The estimates of eq. (2) may reject evidence of a PBC within a rational expectations model because the e t are biased estimates based on incomplete knowledge of past electron results.
The rationally-astute electorate is assumed to anticipate policy stimulus from an incumbent party (as proxied by EV3 or any EV). If the incumbent party loses an election, the rationally-astute electorate goes back and adjusts EV3 to conform to WEV3. which predicts no stimulus prior to an election in which the incumbent party loses. This variable denoted WEV.* (where "." is 1 to 4) is substituted for EV in eq.
(1) to obtain error terms by a rolling regression technique. The results, not reported, show that the WEV.* coefficients are not positive and significant in eq. (2) for the base or M/. Therefore, there is no evidence of a PBC based on the one-period ahead forecast errors computed from the reaction function that includes the modified WEV variables (WEV.*).
Conclusion
A necessary condition for a political business cycle (PBC) is that there is purposeful tampering with economic policy variables prior to elections. This paper employs annual data and initially presents evidence of extra growth in the monetary base (but not the money supply) in the two years prior to an election and in the two years prior to the successful reelection of the incumbent party. The significant electoral specific coefficients, however, occur only during the 1930 s and 1940s. A rational expectations model that explicitly allows the voters to be rational and astute (because they change their forecast model after an incumbent party fails to win reelection) provides no evidence of a PBC.
